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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court of 
Appeals by Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(d) (1988) and Rule 3(a) R. 
Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment granted in favor 
of plaintiff by Judge Edward A. Watson of the Third Circuit Court 
of Salt Lake City, West Valley Department, Case No. 873-000531-CV. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following constitute the significant issues on appeals 
1. Did the trial court commit error by allowing plaintiff to 
maintain this action absent plaintiff's compliance with statutory 
requirements of pleading and proof? 
2. Did the trial court commit error in granting summary 
judgment to plaintiff on the grounds of unjust enrichment? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes and Rules are believed to be deter-
minative of the respective issues stated: 
1. Statutes: 
(a) Utah Code Ann. §58A-l-26 (1981), Utah Code Ann. 
§58A-la-13 (1985) and Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) are iden-
tical and provide: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of this 
state for collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
2. Rules: 
Rule 56(c), U.R.C.P. provides: 
(c) Motion and Proceedings thereon. The 
motion shall be served at least ten days 
before the time fixed for the hearing. The 
adverse party prior to the day of hearing may 
serve opposing affidavits. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadingsf depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlo-
cutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone, although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action on a contract initiated by 
plaintiff against defendant in August, 1987, in which plaintiff 
seeks judgment in the principal sum of $2,521.00 claimed by plain-
tiff to be the balance due and owing under the contract sued upon. 
(See Amended Complaint, R.16). 
On August 30, 1982, the parties entered into a Management 
Agreement (R.3) for the management of that condominium complex 
known as the Donner Crest Condominium, which contract became 
effective September 1, 1982. The contract was terminated by 
defendant effective November 30f 1986. 
During the course of the employment agreement, plaintiff 
employed two subcontractors to perform certain services for and on 
behalf of defendant: (a) Cover-Pools, Inc., for the installation 
of a swimming pool cover on defendant's property in October, 1985, 
for which plaintiff charged defendant $606.70 (R.35); and (b) 
HanDayMen for painting interior walls, railings and other surfaces 
at the condominium complex during March and April of 1986, for 
which HanDayMen charged plaintiff $2,057.00 and plaintiff in turn 
charged defendant the amount of $2,202.00 (R.54,55,101,102 ) . 
At no time between August 30, 1982 and November 30, 1986 
was plaintiff licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the 
Utah Department of Business Regulation, Division of Contractors 
(now known as the Division of Occupational and Professional 
Licensing) (R.56), nor were Cover-Pools, Inc. or HanDayMen 
licensed as a general or specialty contractor by the Utah Depart-
ment of Business Regulation at the time the services were per-
formed by them at the Donner Crest Condominium. (R.51,52). 
Plaintiff filed its original complaint (R«6) in this case 
on August 5, 1987, and filed an amended complaint (R.16) on 
September 11, 1987. In neither plaintiff's original complaint nor 
in plaintiff's amended complaint did plaintiff allege that plain-
tiff was a properly licensed contractor when the contract sued 
upon was entered into and when the cause of action arose. 
During the course of the proceedings, the parties sub-
mitted interrogatories and request for production of documents, 
following which defendant moved for summary judgment against 
plaintiff essentially on the grounds that since neither plaintiff 
nor its subcontractors were licensed as required by the 
Contractor's Licensing Act (Utah Code Ann. §58-50-1 et seq. 1987) 
and its predecessor statutes, the plaintiff could not commence or 
maintain this action without alleging and proving that he was a 
properly licensed contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of action arose, and for 
the further reason that the contract sued upon by plaintiff is 
deemed void and unenforceable. (See Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, R.62). Shortly 
thereafter plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $2,521.39 representing the balance 
due under the contract. (See plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Notice of Hearing, R.82).l The respective motions 
were argued before the Honorable Edward A. Watson, Circuit Judge, 
on August 16, 1988. 
On September 27, 1988, the trial court entered its Fin-
dings of fact and Conclusions of Law and entered Judgment in favor 
of plaintiff and against defendant for the value of goods and ser-
vices in the sum of $2,808,70 on grounds of unjust enrichment. 
[The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Judgment are 
included in the Addendum to this Brief]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR BY 
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION 
ABSENT PLAINTIFF1S COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY 
REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADING AND PROOF 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law correctly found that during the time period [while the 
management contract was in force from September 1, 1982 until 
November 30, 1986] plaintiff was not licensed as a general or spe-
cialty contractor by the Utah Department of Business Regulation, 
Division of Contractors, the statute in effect when the contract 
was entered into and the work in question was performed required 
plaintiff to be licensed, and the contract between plaintiff and 
It should be pointed out that there were no contro-
verted facts by either party. Further, plaintiff 
acknowledged that neither plaintiff, HanDayMen nor 
Cover-Pools, Inc. was licensed as a general or spe-
cialty contractor by the Division of Contractors. 
(See paragraph 4 of Plaintiff's Response to 
Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, R.115,116). 
defendant violated the statute which was in place at the time the 
contract was entered into (Findings of Fact, K1[2,3,8). The trial 
court correctly concluded that the contract between plaintiff and 
defendant was unenforceable (Conclusions of Law, Hi). Yet the 
trial court totally ignored the prohibition of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statutes precluding plaintiff 
as acting as agent or commencing or maintaining any action in any 
court of this state for collection of compensation for the perfor-
mance of any act for which a license is required, and entered 
judgment against defendant in excess of the amount demanded by 
plaintiff. The trial court failed to acknowledge that plaintiff 
did not allege and plead that plaintiff was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into and when 
the alleged cause of action arose. The trial court improperly 
allowed plaintiff to maintain his action against defendant 
contrary to the statutory mandate requiring plaintiff to allege 
and prove that plaintiff was licensed in order to maintain his 
action against defendant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON GROUNDS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
In this case there was no genuine issue as to any 
material of fact. Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to 
granted summary judgment to plaintiff only if plaintiff was 
entitled judgment as a matter of law. Defendant alleges that 
plaintiff was not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law 
but, contrarily, defendant was entitled to judgment against plain-
tiff as a matter of law since the Utah Supreme Court has held that 
an unlicensed contractor who was statutorily barred from 
collecting compensation on his contract for work done could not 
alternatively recover on a theory of unjust enrichment. Further, 
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the 
theory of unjust enrichment since plaintiff's only claim for 
relief in his amended complaint was for the alleged balance due 
under the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ALLOWING PLAINTIFF 
TO MAINTAIN THIS ACTION ABSENT PLAINTIFF'S COMPLIANCE 
WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS OF PLEADING AND PROOF 
The current Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its pre-
decessor statutes deal with a contractor's right to maintain an 
action in the courts of this state. The operative statute in 
effect at the time the contract sued upon was entered into was 
Utah Code Ann S58A-1-26 (1981), and when plaintiff's cause of 
action arose the operative statute was Utah Code Ann. §58A-la-13 
(1985). These sections remain unchanged since the initial adop-
tion in 1981.(2) Section 58-50-11 provides: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of this state 
for collection of compensation for the perfor-
mance of any act for which a license is 
<2) Utah Code Ann. §58A-l-26, (1981), Enacted Laws 1981 
Ch. 23, §26, effective May 12, 1981; Utah Code Ann. 
§58A-la-13, (1985), Enacted Laws 1985, Ch. 171, §2, 
effective July 1, 1985; Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11, 
(1987), Enacted Laws 1987, Ch. 247, §11, effective 
July 1, 1987. 
required by this Chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose, (Emphasis added). 
The statute is specific in its requirement that the 
plaintiff allege and prove that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was entered into and when 
the alleged cause of action arose. Absent such pleading and 
proof, plaintiff cannot maintain this action against defendant 
since the contract upon which plaintiff sues is deemed void and 
unenforceable. Olsen vs. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 416, 200 P.2d 733, 
736 (1948); Meridian Corporation vs. McGynn-Garmaker Company, 567 
P.2d 1110, 1111 (Utah 1977); Fillmore Products, Inc. vs. Western 
States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977); George vs. 
Oren Ltd. & Associates, 672 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1983). 
The trial court in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law correctly found that during the time period [while the 
management contract was in force from September 1, 1982 until 
November 30, 1986], plaintiff was not licensed as a general or 
specialty contractor by the Utah Department of Business 
Regulation, Division of Contractors [Findings of Fact, 12]; the 
statute in effect when the contract was entered and the work in 
question was performed required plaintiff to be licensed [Findings 
of Fact, H3]; and that the contract between plaintiff and defen-
dant violates the statute which was in place at the time the 
contract was entered [Findings of Fact, J[8 ] . The trial court 
concluded that the contract between plaintiff and defendant is 
unenforceable [Conclusions of Lawf Jl]. The court nonetheless 
entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant on a 
theory of unjust enrichment [Conclusions of Law, J2], The trial 
court totally ignored the prohibition of Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 
(1987) and its predecessor statutes precluding plaintiff from 
acting as agent or commencing or maintaining any action in any 
court of this state for collection of compensation for the perfor-
mance of any act for which a license is required. The court 
failed to acknowledge that plaintiff did not allege and plead that 
plaintiff was a properly licensed contractor when the contract 
sued upon was entered into and when the alleged cause of action 
arose. 
The court correctly acknowledged that the statute in 
effect when the contract was entered into and the work in question 
was performed required plaintiff to be licensed, that plaintiff 
was not licensed as a general or specialty contractor, and that 
the contract sued upon was unenforceable, yet the trial court 
nonetheless allowed plaintiff to maintain his action against 
defendant contrary to the statutory mandate requiring plaintiff to 
allege and prove plaintiff was licensed in order to maintain his 
action against defendant. It was manifest error for the trial 
court to ignore the statutory prohibition precluding plaintiff 
from maintaining this action. 
II 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO PLAINTIFF ON GROUNDS OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: 
[Summary] Judgment . . . shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, 
(Emphasis added). 
In this case there was no genuine issue as to any 
material fact. Accordingly, the trial court was obligated to 
grant summary judgment to plaintiff only if plaintiff was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. Defendant asserts that plaintiff 
was not entitled to summary judgment as as matter of law. 
The Utah Supreme Court repeatedly has held that Utah sta-
tutes requiring the licensing of contractors are for the protec-
tion of the public. Olsen vs. Reese, op.cit.; George vs. Oren 
Ltd. & Associates, op.cit.; Fillmore Products, Inc. vs. Western 
States Paving, Inc., op.cit.; Ecklund vs. Elwell, 116 Utah 521, 
211 P.2d 849 (1949). The Utah Supreme Court also has held that an 
unlicensed contractor who was statutorily barred from collecting 
compensation on his contract for work done could not alternatively 
recover on a theory of unjust enrichment. Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. vs. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766, 768 (Utah 1985). 
In a case involving a statute requiring well drillers to 
secure and maintain annual permits, the Utah Supreme Court has 
held that such statute is designed for the protection of the 
people of this State, and that one who drills a well in Utah 
without first securing such permit cannot recover for work done, 
either on a contract or on a theory of quantum meruit. Mosely vs. 
Johnson, 22 Utah 2d 348, 453 P.2d 149 (1969). The court stated: 
We are unable to see why this plaintiff, whose 
contract is void, should be able to recover on 
the theory of quantum meruit. To permit him to 
do so would permit him to evade the law and 
recover for work which he was forbidden to pur-
sue. If he got the reasonable value of his 
services, he might even prove more than his 
contract would have given him had it been 
valid. 
* * * 
Where a contract is unenforceable by one of the 
parties thereto by reason of his noncompliance 
with a license . . . law, such party may not 
recover for services which he has performed 
under such contract. 
453 P.2d at 151. 
It is obvious that the statute . . . is 
designed for the protection of the people of 
this State, and the one who drills a well in 
Utah without first securing an annual permit 
cannot recover in the courts of this State for 
the work done, either on a contract or on a 
theory of quantum meruit. 
* * * 
The court will no more assist one who fails to 
secure a required license to recover money by 
means of a lien foreclosure than it will in an 
action on the contract or on a theory of quan-
tum meruit. 
Id at 152. 
Based on the prior holdings of the Utah Supreme Court, 
plaintiff was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on a 
theory of unjust enrichment, a theory which was not pleaded by 
plaintiff in plaintiff's initial or amended Complaint. (R.6; 
R.16) . 
It would appear that the trail court failed to view all 
of the facts and circumstances in a light most favorable to defen-
dant in defendant's opposition to plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment, a view by the trial court to which defendant was 
entitled. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. vs. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53 
(Utah 1981); Bihlmaier vs. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979); 
Norton vs. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (1983); Bowen vs. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434 (1987); B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. vs. Collins 
Food Services, Inc., 754 P.2d 99 (Utah App. 1988). 
The trial court should have denied plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment and granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment. Defendant moved for summary judgment essentially on the 
grounds that since neither plaintiff nor his subcontractors were 
licensed as required by law the contract sued upon was void and 
unenforceable, and plaintiff was prohibited from maintaining his 
action by Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor sta-
tutes . Assuming the trial court viewed all of the facts and cir-
cumstances in a light most favorable to plaintiff in considering 
defendant's motion for summary judgment, the trial court nonethe-
less should have granted judgment to defendant as a matter of law. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff judgment against defen-
dant in the total principal sum of $2,808.70 (Judgment, Hi), yet 
plaintiff only requested judgment in its initial and amended 
complaint in the sum of $2,521.39 (See fA of Prayer for Relief, 
Complaint, (R.5); flA of Prayer for Relief, Amended Complaint, 
(R.15)). Plaintiff admitted that the balance claimed to be due 
under the contract was $2,521.39 (See Affidavit of John Holland, 
59 (R.85); 55, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Notice 
of Hearing (R.8D). There is absolutely nothing in the record to 
record to support the judgment awarded plaintiff in the sum of 
$2,808.70. 
Defendant asserts it was manifest error for the court to 
deny defendant's motion for summary judgment and grant plaintiff's 
motion for summary judgment on grounds of unjust enrichment, and 
in an amount not supported by the record.(3) 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the trial court committed manifest 
error in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
against defendant. Not only did the trial court ignore the man-
date of Utah Code Ann. §58-50-11 (1987) and its predecessor statu-
tes, but also the trial court committed error in awarding summary 
judgment to plaintiff on grounds of unjust enrichment since the 
case law prevents recovery either on contract or on a theory of 
quantum meruit. 
Defendant urges this court to reverse the judgment of the 
trial court and order entry of summary judgment in favor of defen-
dant . 
(3) Plaintiff moved for summary judgment on the 
management contract only and not on grounds 
of quantum meruit. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of January, 1989. 
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vs. Civil No. 873-000531-CV 
DONNER CREST HOMEOWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff's and defendant's respective Motions for Summary 
Judgment came on regularly for hearing on Tuesday, August 16, 
1988, the honorable Edward A. Watson presiding. Plaintiff 
appeared through counsel, Wendy G. Bates and defendant appeared 
through counsel, Warren M. Weggeland. Having listened to the 
arguments of counsel and considered the memoranda on file, and 
good cause appearing, the court enters the following Judgment 
based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered 
herein: 
1. The plaintiff is granted judgment against the defendant 
in the total principal sum of $2,808.70. 
2. No interest shall be awarded to date of judgment, but 
plaintiff is awarded interest from the date of judgment until 
a <5 n r n v i 
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Valley City, Utah: 
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DONNER CREST HOMEOWNERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Defendant. 
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